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Smith: Smith: What Happened to the Equity in Equitable Subrogation

What Happened to the Equity in Equitable

Subrogation?
Metmor Financial,Inc. v. Landoll Corp.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of equitable subrogation provides courts with a vehicle to
allow a lending institution that has paid off an existing loan to take the original
lending institution's place in priority status. 2 While the doctrine appears quite
simple, courts have been remarkably inconsistent in their approaches to allowing
equitable subrogation claims. This Note discusses the various approaches taken
by courts today, and more importantly, analyzes Missouri's current approach as
affirmed most recently in Metnor Financial,Inc. v. Landoll Corporation.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In April of 1995, Vickie Lynn Beck and Melvin Scott Beck (hereinafter
"the Becks") sought to purchase a piece of real property from Howard and
Virginia Johnson (hereinafter "the Johnsons").4 The Johnsons, however, had a
pre-existing mortgage on their property with Sterling National Bank.' On April
9, 1995, the Becks began discussions with Metmor Financial (hereinafter6
"Metmor") about financing their prospective purchase from the Johnsons.
Metmor approved the Becks' financing only after the Becks agreed that Metmor
would obtain first-lien status on its mortgage.7
In early May of 1995, Chicago Title Company (hereinafter "Chicago Title")
was asked to examine the title and conduct the closing.8 Meanwhile, on May 15,
1995, unknown to Metmor and the Becks, Landoll Corporation (hereinafter
"Landoll") obtained and filed ajudgment against the Johnsons and their wholly
owned corporation.9 On May 16, 1995, a Chicago Title employee conducted a
judgment search of the records to determine if any intervening judgments had
been filed against the Johnsons.' The employee failed to locate the then existing

1. 976 S.W.2d 454 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
2. See generally GRANT S.NELSON &DALE. A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE
LAw § 10.6 (3d ed. 1994).
3. 976 S.W.2d 454 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
4. Id. at 456.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Metmor Fin., Inc. v. Landoll Corp., 976 S.W.2d 454 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
9. Id. at 457. The court does not provide any further specifics as to the judgment
filed by Landoll, other than to assert its validity as against the Johnsons and their wholly
owned corporation.
10. Id.
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lien against the Johnsons and reported to Chicago Title that no outstanding
judgments existed against the Johnsons." Chicago Title then promptly recorded
the Deed of Trust and Missouri Warranty Deed relating to the sale of the
property from the Johnsons to the Becks.12 Following that, Chicago Title, at the
request of the Becks, then disbursed the loan proceeds received from Metmor to
Sterling National Bank in payment of the Johnsons' pre-existing loan. 3
On July 25, 1995, Landoll initiated execution proceedings to recover its
previously recorded judgment against the Johnsons. 4 Landoll sought to levy the
property by ajudicial sale scheduled for September 12, 1995.15 Metmor and the
Becks responded by filing a petition requesting declaratory and injunctive relief
against Landoll.16

The trial court temporarily enjoined the judicial sale of the property on
September 12, 1995." Metmor filed an amended petition on November 16,
1995, seeking permanent injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment under the
theory of equitable subrogation. 8 On October 7, 1996, the trial court dissolved
the temporary injunction and denied Metmor's request for a permanent
injunction based on equitable subrogation. 9
On appeal, Metmor argued that relief based on equitable subrogation was
appropriate because (1) Metmor had paid the Sterling lien obligation at the
request of the Becks; (2) Metmor intended to obtain first-lien status; and (3)
Landoll would not be prejudiced because Landoll would retain the same lien
status it would have had if Metmor had not paid off the previously. existing
Sterling loan.2"
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District of Missouri
disagreed. The court held that even when a lender shows that an intervening

11. Id. The Chicago Title employee was unable to locate any existing judgments
against the Johnsons because she failed to properly conduct her search. Id. While the
employee typed in "Howard Johnson" and "Virginia Johnson," these locators were
unsuccessful in locating the Landoll judgment. Id. The court suggests that the judgment
was not revealed because the judgment index required the input of different data when
the lawsuit involves multiple parties. Id. Hence, the employee would have needed to
type "Johnson, et al." in order to locate the Landoll judgment. Id.
12. Id.

13. Metmor Fin., Inc. v. Landoll Corp., 976 S.W.2d 454,457 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
14. Id. at 458.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.

18. Metmor Fin., Inc. v. Landoll Corp., 976 S.W.2d 454, 458 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
The Becks also filed an amended petition previously on October 18, 1995, requesting
declaratory relief against Landoll alleging that Landoll had failed to give proper notice
of the judicial sale. Id. The trial court, however, denied the Becks relief on that ground.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 461.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/7
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judgment holder would be no worse off than it would have been had the lender
never paid off the existing mortgage, and even when a lender intends to obtain
first-lien status, if that lender had constructive notice of the previously recorded
judgment, application of equitable subrogation is inappropriate in the absence of
any complicity by the intervening judgment holder.21 Shortly thereafter, on April
28, 1998, the Missouri Supreme Court denied Metmor's motion for rehearing.'
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Subrogation can be properly classified as either conventional subrogation
or equitable subrogation.' Conventional subrogation arises from an express
agreement among the parties that the person or entity discharging the prior lien
will be substituted to the priority of the prior lienee. 24 Equitable subrogation,
however, arises when the subrogating intent is implied by operation of law.'
While courts have been largely consistent in their application of conventional
subrogation, the same is not true of their application of equitable subrogation. 6
Generally speaking, courts agree that mortgagees asserting equitable subrogation
must show that they intended to assume first priority and that the intervening
judgment holder is not prejudiced by allowing the mortgagee to "jump" in
priority.27 The divergence among the courts occurs when deciding whether
actual or constructive notice of an intervening lien will preclude a lender from
claiming application of the doctrine of equitable subrogation. The following
section seeks to address the various approaches taken and the asserted reasons
behind each of them.

A. Missouri Case Law
The doctrine of equitable subrogation-has existed in Missouri for over a
century. 8 In Missouri's first known equitable subrogation case, Bunn v.
Lindsay,29 the Missouri Supreme Court specifically held that the failure of a
mortgagee seeking subrogation to locate a recorded intervening judgment will

21. Id. at461-62.
22. Id. at 454. The case was ultimately retransferred on October 20, 1998, and
readopted by the Court of Appeals on October 26, 1998. Id.
23. See Carol Vento, Annotation, DischargeofMortgageand Taking Back ofNew
Mortgage asAffecting Lien InterveningBetween Old and New Mortgages,43 A.L.R.5th

519 (1996).
24. Id.

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 7.6 cmt. e (1996).

28. See Bunn v. Lindsay, 7 S.W. 473 (Mo. 1888).
29. Id.
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bar that mortgagee from asserting a subrogation right.30 In Bunn, the plaintiff
mortgagee requested that the court grant him subrogation to the original
mortgage because he not only had intended to have such priority status, but also
had failed to obtain actual notice of the recorded intervening judgment.31 The
Bunn court, however, held that when a lien is recorded, the 'judgment [becomes]
spread upon the public records in order that all who might deal with the property
might know of its existence., 32 As such, any failure to locate that lien would
come as a result of the mortgagee's own negligence, for which he has no one to
blame but himself.33 Under such circumstances, the Bunn court stated that it
would not, through the use of equity, relieve the mortgagee "by interfering with
'
the legal rights of others who are without fault."34
Since Bunn, Missouri courts have consistently refused to allow subrogation
claims where the mortgagee seeking subrogation received constructive notice,
via recording, of the intervening judgment.a5 The courts have essentially
determined that a mortgagee's failure to locate a recorded intervening lien is a
result of that mortgagee's own negligence, and therefore should appropriately
bar equitable subrogation claims.3 6
For example, in Landmark Bank v. J. V Ciaravino,37 plaintiff Landmark
Bank employed a title company to conduct a title search and facilitate the
closing. 3 However, the title company negligently failed to locate an existing
lien. 39 Landmark then iook the deed of trust.4" Shortly thereafter, the existing

30. Id. at 476. Missouri's current recording statute provides that documents filed
for record with the recorder shall "impart notice to all persons of the contents thereof and
all subsequent purchasers and mortgagees shall be deemed, in law and equity, to purchase
with notice." Mo. REv. STAT. §442.390 (1994) (emphasis added).
31. See Bunn, 7 S.W. at 475-76.
32. Id. at 476. The Bunn court denied equitable subrogation despite the fact that
the intervening lienor had sustained no diminution in the value of his lien.
33. Bunn v. Lindsay, 7 S.W. 473,476 (Mo. 1888).
34. Id.
35. See infra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
37. 752 S.W.2d 923 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
38. Id. at 924-25.
39. There were actually a series of recorded deeds of trust on the property. The
third deed oftrust, held by lenholder Royal Bank, was the deed of trust which Landmark
was unaware of, and against which it was seeking subrogation rights against. Id.
Landmark believed that it was being issued the third deed of trust, and that the majority
of the money it was loaning to the borrower was being used to pay off the second deed
of trust. Id. Hence, Landmark believed that it would be holding a second deed of trust
in the real estate. Id. In fact, the deed of trust expressly recited, "subject to a first deed
of trust." Id. However, while the money was used to pay off the second deed of trust,
there was in fact an additional prior recorded deed of trust, that held by Royal Bank. Id.
40. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/7

4

Smith: Smith: What Happened to the Equity in Equitable Subrogation

1999]

EQUITABLE SUBROGATION

lienholder asserted its priority status against Landmark. 41 At trial, Landmark
requested that the court grant subrogation rights against the prior recorded
lienholder.42 The court suggested that allowing subrogation where constructive
notice was present "would be nothing less than a judicial repeal of [Missouri's
Recording Statute] and would place the lending of money secured by real estate
' The court concluded that equitable
at great risk and insecurity."43
subrogation
would not be granted to a lender "if [that lender] has been placed into the
position in which [that lender] finds [it]self because of [its own] culpable and
inexcusable neglect."

Missouri courts, however, have allowed equitable subrogation claims inrare

and extreme cases "bordering on if not reaching the level of fraud."45 This was
the case in State Savings Trust Co. v. Spencer,4 where the borrower came to the
plaintiff seeking a loan to pay off his first deed of trust, which was being
threatened by foreclosure.47 The plaintiff agreed to give the borrower a loan,
provided that it would be granted the first deed of trust's position in terms of
priority.48 While the borrower was successful in gaining subordination of the
second deed of trust holder, the borrower did not obtain such subordination from
the third deed of trust holder.4 9 Instead, the borrower forged an instrument which
purported to give plaintiff the subordination of the third deed of trust holder to
advance ahead of him in priority status."0 Because the instrument was forged,
the subordination was held not legally valid.5' As such, the plaintiff was forced
to seek equitable subrogation against the third deed of trust holder.5 2 Under
these limited circumstances, where criminal conduct was employed to cover up
an existing valid lien, 3 and where the existing lienholder would be in no worse
position than it would have been had the original lien not been paid off,5 4 the
Spencer court allowed the plaintiff his equitable subrogation claim." The
Spencer case appears to be the only Missouri case that has allowed an equitable
subrogation claim to survive in the face of constructive notice.
Missouri's case law concerning equitable subrogation over the past century
has been largely consistent. In short, Missouri's case law stands for the
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 925.
Landmark Bank v. J.V. Ciaravino, 752 S.W.2d 923, 925 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
Id. at 928.
Id. See also Baker v. Farmer's Bank, 279 S.W. 428 (Mo. Ct. App. 1926).
LandmarkBank, 752 S.W.2d at 928.
201 S.W. 967 (Mo. Ct. App. 1918).
Id. at 968.
Id.
Id.
Id.
State Say. Trust Co. v. Spencer, 201 S.W. 967, 970 (Mo. Ct. App. 1918).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 971.
Id.
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proposition that, except in instances bordering on fraud, any notice, either actual
or constructive, is enough to defeat a claim for equitable subrogation.56
B. Other JurisdictionsFollowingMissouri'sApproach
While the approach taken by Missouri's courts represents a distinct minority
in the country, there are several cases outside of Missouri holding that not only
actual, but also constructive notice, is enough to defeat a claim for equitable
subrogation."7
In Belcher v. Belcher,58 for example, the court determined that where upon
the exercise of reasonable diligence by examination of public records the
mortgagee could have obtained notice of intervening judgments, that mortgagee
shall not be given the right of equitable subrogation. 9 Such a rule, the Belcher
court suggested, "makes it incumbent upon a purchaser to consult available
records in regard to contemplated real property transactions,"'6° and at the same
time, "minimizes, as to those transactions, the effect of any uncertainty of
representation between vendor and vendee concerning encumbrances of
record."6' A handful of other cases have agreed with the analysis of Belcher,and
have reached similar conclusions. 62
C. MajorityApproach
In contrast to Missouri's line of cases, the majority of jurisdictions today
hold that while actual notice of an intervening judgment
will defeat a claim for
63
equitable subrogation, constructive notice will not.
In Rusher v. Bunker,64 the Oregon Court of Appeals provided an excellent
synopsis of the rationale behind this approach. The court granted subrogation
to a lender who failed to obtain actual notice of a prior recorded lien, 65 holding
that "record notice does not, in itself, defeat the ability of a lender to become

56. See supra notes 30-55 and accompanying text; infra notes 57-59 and
accompanying text.
57. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 7.6 cmt. e (1996).
58. 87 P.2d 762 (Or. 1939).
59. Id. at 764.

60. Id. at 765.
61. Id.
62. See In re Gordon, 164 B.R. 706, 708 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994) (stating

constructive knowledge of lien enough to preclude entitlement to equitable subrogation);
Independence One Mortgage Corp. v. Katsaros, 681 A.2d 1005 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996);
Heiber v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 522 So. 2d 878 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
63. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 7.6 cmt. e (1996).

64. 782 P.2d 170 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
65. Id. at 174.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/7
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equitably subrogated to a senior encumbrance that the lender discharges."'

The

court further stated that constructive notice should be disregarded, as "[i]t can
have no relevancy on the question [of] whether the lender actually expected to
get priority of security in the property because that can be inferred only from his
[or her] actual knowledge." 67 The Rusher court concluded that "[i]nsofar as it
implies that there is culpability in the lender," such negligence should not bar an
equitable subrogation claim by allowing the intervening judgment holder to be
"enriched fortuitously," provided of course that the intervening judgment holder
has not been misled or harmed.68
This approach certainly appears to be the commanding one among
jurisdictions today.6 9 For example, courts applying Alabama, 0 California,7'
New Jersey, 72 New York,73 and South Carolina74 law are among the many
refusing to allow constructive notice of intervening judgments to defeat an
otherwise successful equitable subrogation claim.
D. The Restatement Approach
The Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) takes an even more
liberal approach. Under the Restatement, subrogation can be granted even if the
mortgagee seeking subrogation had actual knowledge of the intervening
interest. 75 As such, the mortgagee's notice, either actual or constructive, is
completely irrelevant.76 The only relevant queries under this approach are (1)
whether the mortgagee reasonably expected to get security with a priority equal

66. Id. at 172.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 7.6 cmt. e (1996).
70. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Grissett, 500 F. Supp. 159, 164 (M.D. Ala. 1980)
("[M]ere constructive notice imputed from the existence of recordation is not sufficient
to preclude... the doctrine of equitable subrogation.").
71. Han v. United States, 944 F.2d 526, 530 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he fact that the
junior encumbrance was recorded will not by itself bar equitable subrogation.").

72. Metrobank v. National Community Bank, 620 A.2d 433, 438 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1993) ("[S]ubrogation is effective only where the new mortgagee is without
actual knowledge of the existence ofjunior encumbrances.").
73. United States v. Baran, 996 F.2d 25, 29 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[S]ubrogation erases

the lender's mistake in failing to discover intervening liens, and grants him the benefit
of having obtained an assignment of the senior lien that he caused to be discharged.")
(applying New York law).

74. Enterprise Bank v. Federal Land Bank, 138 S.E. 146, 148-50 (S.C. 1927)
(stating only actual knowledge of an intervening creditor will defeat a claim for equitable
subrogation).
75. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 7.6 cmt. e (1996).
76. See East Boston Say. Bank v. Ogan, 701 N.E.2d 331, 335 (Mass. 1998);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 7.6 cmt. e (1996).
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to the mortgage being paid; and (2) whether the intervening judgment holder
would be prejudiced by allowing the subrogation.77
This approach, most recently advocated by the American Law Institute, has7
also been employed in a relatively small number of cases in Iowa, 1
Massachusetts,79 New Jersey, 0 and Texas."'
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Metmor Financial,Inc. v. Landoll Corp.,' the Missouri Court of Appeals
for the Western District of Missouri recognized that Metmor had successfully
shown that Landoll would be no worse off than it would have been had Metmor
never paid off the existing mortgage, 3 and that Metmor had intended to obtain
first lien status. Still though, the court held that because Metmor was provided
with constructive notice of Landoll's previously recorded judgment, and because
Landoll was completely innocent of any complicity or fraud, Metmor could not
successfully bring an equitable subrogation claim."
The court first examined the propriety of allowing Metmor an equitable
subrogation claim when Landoll's intervening judgment lien was properly
recorded." The court cited Bunn v. Lindsay,16 where the court refused to allow
an equitable subrogation claim when an intervening judgment was recorded in
the public records and the debtor failed to search the public records and locate

77. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 7.6 cmt. e (1996).

78. Klotz v. Klotz, 440 N.W.2d 406,409-10 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989) (justifying such
an approach because it gives an incentive to parties to advance sums of money in order

to help a property owner avoid forfeiture).
79. EastBoston Say., 701 N.E.2d at 335. In East Boston Savings, the court stated:
We are persuaded by the reasoning of the courts that not only allow
subrogation where the subrogee has actual or constructive knowledge of the
intervening mortgage, but also look to equity to decide if subrogation is
inappropriate .... Knowledge is not necessarily fatal to the grantee's claim
of subrogation, if equity would nonetheless dictate the recognition of
subrogation.
Id.
80. Trus Joist Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 462 A.2d 603, 608 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983), rev'dsubnom. Trus Joint Corp. v. Treetop Assocs., Inc., 477
A.2d 817 (N.J. 1989).
81. Providence Inst. for Say. v. Sims, 441 S.W.2d 516,520 (Tex. 1969) ("We hold
that under these circumstances neither actual nor constructive notice knowledge of the
intervening lien will defeat the right of subrogation .....
82. 976 S.W.2d 454 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
83. Metmor could not bring a successful equitable subrogation claim. Id. at 461-

62.
84. Id.

85. Id. at 461.
86. 7 S.W. 473 (Mo. 1888).
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the judgment. The court also referenced LandmarkBank v. Ciaravino,7 where
the court held that equitable subrogation was not available when a title company
failed to locate existing intervening liens when conducting its title search.88
Finally, the court cited Missouri's recording statute, 89 stating that, in Missouri,
lenders are charged with constructive notice of properly recorded judgments
despite the lender's failure to locate suchjudgments. 90 The court concluded that
Metmor should be charged with constructive notice of the Landoll judgment, and
therefore, equitable subrogation was unavailable. 9' To hold otherwise, the court
noted, "would place in jeopardy the whole system [of] prioritizing liens in
Missouri." 92
Recognizing the potential for exceptions, the Metmor court mentioned State
Savings Trust Co. v. Spencer,93 where the court held that equitable subrogation
was appropriate, notwithstanding constructive notice, when a borrower obtains
money from a lender through the use of a forged instrument, provided that the
superior lienholders were no worse off than they were before the subsequent
lender advanced his money to retire the senior loan. 94 The Metmor court,
however, quickly distinguished its facts by noting that Landoll was "totally
innocent of any complicity in Metmor's loan to the Johnsons."95 Therefore,

because not a single Missouri case existed that allowed a lender to advance
ahead of a recorded lienholder in the absence of complicity by the superior
lienholder in obtaining the loan,96 the Metmor court refused to allow Metmor to
so advance.
The court next examined the propriety of allowing Metmor equitable
subrogation merely upon a showing that Landoll would be no worse off if
subrogation were granted than it would have been had Metmor never paid offthe

87. 752 S.W.2d 923 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
88. Id. at 924-25.
89. Mo. REv. STAT. § 442.390 (1994).
90. Metmor Fin., Inc. v. London Corp., 976 S.W.2d 454,462 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 201 S.W. 967 (Mo. Ct. App. 1918).
at 971.
94. Id.
95. Metmor Fin., Inc. v. London Corp., 976 S.W.2d 454,462 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
96. Id.. at 460-62. The Metmor court's assertion that the existent complicity or
fraud must be by the superior lienholder is questionable. Both the Metmor and Landmark
courts base their position on the principal case, State Savings Trust v. Spencer, 201 S.W.
967 (Mo. Ct. App. 1918). However, in Spencer, it was the borrower who acted
fraudulently, not the superior lienholder. Id. Because the Spencer court allowed the
equitable subrogation claim, the Metmor and Landmark courts have arguably

misconstrued the exception to include only cases where the fraudulent actor is the
superior lienholder. Clearly such a position cannot be logically taken from a fair reading
of the Spencer case.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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Sterling loan obligation." The court again relied on Landmark v. Ciaravino,98
reasoning that "more is required to support an equitable subrogation [claim] than
that the superior liens are no worse off than they were before the subsequent
lender advanced his money to retire the senior loan."'
Hence, the court
determined that Metmor failed to establish sufficient facts to warrant application
of equitable subrogation. °
V. COMMENT

Concededly, the court's decision inMetmor fits well within the confines of
existing Missouri case law. The Metmor court's decision literally shadows the
century-old Bunn v. Lindsay..' decision, which held that constructive notice
alone is enough to defeat a claim for equitable subrogation.
The court properly emphasized the importance of respecting Missouri's
recording statute. Further, the court suggested that to allow equitable
subrogation in the face of such a statute "would place in jeopardy the whole

system ofprioritizing liens inMissouri."' Perhaps though, the court overstates
its position. That is, equitable subrogation does not undermine a state's
recording system (as suggested by the Metmor court). 3 Instead, equitable
subrogation reinforces the importance of a recording system by not allowing
equitable subrogation claims against intervening lienholders who rely to their
detriment on the soundness of their recorded judgments.'°4
Despite this, the Metmor court asserts that both constructive and actual
notice by the lender should effectively bar equitable subrogation claims. 105 The
premise behind this position is that lenders take a high level of responsibility for
their actions. As one scholar suggested, "Banks ought to look after their own
financial dealings very carefully, and [therefore] we should [be able] to assume
that any actions they take reflect judgments that have [been] made based upon

97. Metmor, 976 S.W.2d at 460-62.
98. 752 S.W.2d 923 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
99. Metmor, 976 S.W.2d at 462.
100. Metmor Fin., Inc. v. London Corp., 976 S.W.2d 454, 462 (Mo. Ct. App.
1998).
101. 7 S.W. 473 (Mo. 1888).
102. Metmor, 976 S.W.2d at 462.
103. East Boston Sav. Bank v. Ogan, 701 N.E.2d 331, 336 (Mass. 1998).
104. Id.
105. Metmor Fin., Inc. v. London Corp., 976 S.W.2d 454, 462 (Mo. Ct. App.
1998).
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the record. ' °6 Thus, lenders should not later be able to come into court and
claim ignorance of readily discoverable facts. 7
The Metmor court, however, appears to have completely disregarded the
competing policies involved in making its determination. For example, the court
failed to consider that such a rule confers a huge windfall to the intervening
judgment holder at the expense of the lender's completely justifiable
expectations. The intervening judgment holder, when recording its lien subject
to an existing lien, could not have reasonably expected to suddenly gain first
priority status due to an early payoff of the first lien. Quite the contrary, the
intervening judgment holder knowingly accepts the inherent risks involved in a
second priority status security."0 8 Alternatively, the lender who actually does
provide the funds to pay off the first lien certainly has a justifiable expectation
that it will step into the shoes of the first lienholder.
Additionally, the Metmor court (and likewise, the Missouri approach) fails
to consider a strong public policy argument against disqualifying lenders from
equitable subrogation claims based on constructive or actual notice. Because in
nearly all modem transactions involving payment by a lender of a prior debt the
paying lender will obtain title insurance, "quibbles over the lender's degree of
negligence or notice really come down to a decision whether to cast the loss on
the title insurance underwriter."''3 9 While title companies certainly should bear
losses that directly result from their negligent searches, "it is hard to see why
they should be compelled to pay merely to promote the priority of an intervening
lienor who has suffered no loss and who has no reason to expect or claim such
a promotion."' " Such a rule has "the long-run effect of raising title insurance
costs [at the expense of the general public] in order to give windfalls to a few
lienholders.""' The general public should not be forced to pay for such
unjustified windfalls indirectly through higher title insurance costs.
While a majority of courts today agree that constructive notice should not
bar an equitable subrogation claim, most of these very same courts still bar such
claims in the face of actual notice."l 2 These courts first suggest that the existence
of a lender's actual notice of an intervening lienholder allows the inference that
the lender did not actually expect or intend to get priority of security as against

106. Patrick Randolph, Mortgages: Bank Loses Equitable SubrogationRequest -

Man
Bites
Dog
(visited
<http://cctr.umkc.edu/dept/dirt/dd98/dd042298.htm>.

Feb.9,

1996)

107. Id.

108. East Boston Say. Bank v. Ogan, 701 N.E.2d 331, 335 (Mass. 1998). These
risks include both renewals and extensions of time for payment on the original mortgage.
Id. These actions are not considered prejudicial to the intervening judgment holder
because they do not require the lienholder's approval. Id.
109. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 10.6, at 15.
110. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 10.6, at 15.
111. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 10.6, at 15.
112. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
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the intervening lienholder."' However, such an inference is entirely unnecessary
under the Restatement approach. Instead, under the Restatement, the lender itself
must prove that it indeed did intend to get priority. This approach makes more
sense because instead of binding a lender by arbitrary inferences made about its
intentions, the Restatement provides a lender with the opportunity to come forth
with real evidence to illustrate its actual intentions.
The second major rationale behind the majority approach appears to be that

if indeed the lender had actual notice ofthe intervening lienholder, and intended
to gain first priority status, then the lender should have taken the appropriate
steps to effectuate its intentions. However, such a rationale incorrectly assumes
that every lender has a complete and sophisticated understanding of the
intricacies of mortgage law. Quite simply, the average lender is probably not
aware of the limited technical devices. 4 that may be used to properly subrogate
itself to the priority of an original lienholder. It seems unjust to penalize those
lending institutions that do not have sophisticated real estate attorneys who are
aware of such devices. Penalizing these lending institutions in effect places the
sophisticated lender's intentions at a higher status than those of the
unsophisticated lender.
The best approach, that taken by the Restatement,"' is that where the junior
lienor is not prejudiced by allowing equitable subrogation," 6 and where the
lender intended to take first-lien status, the subrogation claim should be allowed.
The lender has "superior equities" to
those of the junior lienor, who will lose
7
subrogation.1
of
result
a
as
nothing
The Restatement approach can be analogized to ordinary tort law. For
example, in a simple negligence claim, a negligent tortfeasor cannot be
compelled to pay damages unless she causes hann to someone. The mere fact
that a tortfeasor is negligent does not, by itself, give rise to a negligence cause
of action. Conventional wisdom suggests such a cause of action would provide
an unjustified windfall to the plaintiff.
113. See Rusher v. Bunker, 782 P.2d 170, 172 (Or. Ct. App. 1988).
114. See Dale Whitman, Equitable Subrogationfor "Non-Innocent" Lenders,
(visited Feb. 9, 1996) <http://cctr.umkc.edu/dept/dirt/dd98/dd050798.htm>. For
example, the lender can enter into an express agreement with the original lender that it
will gain the priority of the mortgage it is paying. The intervening lienor need not be
involved in the agreement at all. If such an agreement is in writing, then provided that
the intervening lienor is not prejudiced, most courts will enforce it under "conventional
subrogation" theory. Alternatively, the lender can insist that the initial lender give it an
assignment of the initial mortgage, instead of releasing the mortgage. That assignment
can subsequently be recorded, thus making it clear on the records that the refinancing
lender has the original lender's priority.
115. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 7.6 cmt. e (1996).
116. That is, no prejudice is present where the junior lienor occupies the same
position as before the prior lien was paid and discharged.

117. See Theodore R. Vogt, Note, Mortgages- Subrogationof One Whose Loan
is Used to Pay a SeniorMortgage, 36 MICH. L. REv. 151, 153-54 (1937).
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The same arguably should hold true in mortgage law. A lender's
negligence in failing to locate a recorded intervening judgment should not
automatically disqualify the lender from an equitable subrogation claim. Rather,
the law should require an intervening judgment holder to show that it was
somehow "harmed" or "prejudiced" by the lender's negligence. Only then
should a lender be disqualified from an equitable subrogation claim.
In short, the Restatement approach appears to best implement the principles
involved in equitable subrogation. Its approach provides a result that best
coincides with both the lender's and the intervening lienholder's expectations.
Additionally, this approach eliminates unjustified windfalls by allowing a lender
to advance in priority if no intervening lienholder would otherwise be
prejudiced. The absence of such windfalls, at the expense of title companies,
ultimately results in more affordable title insurance fees for the general public.
VI. CONCLUSION

While no one can seriously doubt that the decision in Metmor falls within

the boundaries of Missouri's equitable subrogation case law, that alone should
not insulate the decision from criticism. The current approach in Missouri, as
employed by the Metmor court, is that constructive notice (as well as actual
notice) should disqualify a lender from an equitable subrogation claim. Nearly
all courts in the nation today have realized the inequities involved in such a
result. In Missouri, however, lenders and title companies must continue to ask,
"What happened to the equity in equitable subrogation?"

ROBERT M. SMITH
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